**Efficient proving for distributed access-control systems**

Lujo Bauer, Scott Garriss, Michael K. Reiter

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CyLab
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

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Lujo Bauer Scott Garriss Michael K. Reiter

**Abstract**

We present a new algorithm for generating a formal proof that an access request satisfies access-control policy, for use in logic-based access-control frameworks. Our algorithm is tailored to settings where credentials needed to complete a proof might need to be obtained from, or reactively created by, distant components in a distributed system. In such contexts, our algorithm substantially improves upon previous proposals in both computation and communication costs, and better guides users to create the most appropriate credentials in those cases where needed credentials do not yet exist. At the same time, our algorithm offers strictly superior proving ability, in the sense that it finds a proof in every case that previous approaches would (and more). We detail our algorithm and empirically evaluate an implementation of it using policies in active use in a testbed at our institution for experimenting with access-control technologies.

## 1 Introduction

Much work has given credence to the notion that formal reasoning can be used to buttress the assurance one has in an access-control system. While early work in this vein *modeled* access-control systems using formal logics (e.g., [15, 28]), recent work has imported logic into the system as a means to *implement* access control (e.g., [10]). In these systems, the resource monitor evaluating an access request requires a proof, in formal logic, that the access satisfies access-control policy. In such a proof, digitally signed credentials are used to instantiate formulas of the logic (e.g., "$K_{\mathsf{Alice}}$ **signed delegate**$(\mathsf{Alice}, \mathsf{Bob}, \mathsf{resource})$" or "$K_{\mathsf{CA}}$ **signed** $K_{\mathsf{Alice}}$ **speaksfor** $K_{\mathsf{CA}}.\mathsf{Alice}$"), and then inference rules are used to derive a proof that a required policy is satisfied (e.g., "$\mathsf{Manager}$ **says open**$(\mathsf{resource})$"). The resource monitor, then, need only validate that each request is accompanied by a valid proof of the required policy.

Because the resource monitor accepts *any* valid proof of the required policy, this framework offers potentially a high degree of flexibility in how proofs are constructed. This flexibility, however, is not without its costs. First, it is essential that the logic is sound and free from unintended consequences, giving rise to a rich literature in designing appropriate authorization logics (e.g., [15, 29, 23, 20]). Second, and of primary concern in this paper, it must be possible to efficiently find proofs for accesses that should be allowed. Rather than devising a proof strategy customized to each application, we would prefer to develop a general proof-building strategy that is driven by the logic itself and that is effective in a wide range of applications.

In this paper we describe a new algorithm for constructing such proofs in a system where needed credentials are distributed among different components of the system, if they exist at all, and may be created at distant components reactively and with human intervention. In comparison to previous works in this area (notably [9]), we show that our algorithm will find a proof whenever previous algorithms will (and will find some even when they do not), and that for realistic policies, our algorithm achieves dramatic improvements to the efficiency of proof construction in practice. Our algorithm builds from three key principles. First, our algorithm strategically delays pursuing "expensive" subgoals until, through further progress in the proving

process, it is clear that these subgoals would be helpful to prove. Second, our algorithm precomputes trust relationships among principles in a way that can significantly optimize the proving process on the critical path of an access. Third, our algorithm eliminates the need to hand-craft *tactics* to guide the proof search process to be efficient, a fragile and time-intensive process. Instead, it utilizes a new, systematic approach to generating good tactics from the inference rules of the logic.

The algorithm we report here is motivated by an ongoing deployment at our institution of a testbed environment where proof-based access control is used to control access to both physical resources (e.g., door access) and information resources (e.g., computer logins). The system has been deployed for over a year, guards access to 35 resources spanning two floors of our office building, and is used daily by over 20 users. In this deployment, smartphones are used as the vehicle for constructing proofs and soliciting consent from users for the creation of new credentials reactively, and the cellular network is the means by which these smartphones communicate to retrieve needed proofs of subgoals. In such an environment, both computation and communication have high latency, and so limiting use of these resources is essential to offering reasonable response times to users. And, for the sake of usability, it is essential that we involve users in the proof generation process (i.e., to create new credentials) infrequently and with as much guidance as possible. We have developed the algorithm we report here with these goals in mind, and our deployment suggests that it offers acceptable performance for the policies with which we have experimented and is a drastic improvement over previous approaches. All of the examples used in this paper are actual policies drawn from the deployment. In addition, we evaluate the scalability of our algorithm on larger synthetically-generated policies in Section 6.2.

The contributions of this paper are to: (1) identify the requirements of a proving algorithm in a distributed access-control system with dynamic credential creation (Section 2), (2) propose mechanisms for precomputing trust relationships (Section 4), delaying the execution of expensive subgoals (Section 5.1), and systematically generating tactics (Section 5.2), (3) describe a technique for combining these various algorithms to yield a prover that is dramatically more efficient than previous approaches (Section 5), and (4) evaluate our technique on a collection of policies representative of those used in practice (Section 6). Although we described and evaluated our algorithm with respect to a particular access-control logic, it can be applied to other logics as well. For example, our algorithm can be used to good effect with the various logics that encode SPKI [4, 29, 23], SD3 [24], and the RT family of logics [30]. In Section 7, we discuss our ability to represent these logics and the ability of our algorithms to perform efficiently on a variety of policies.

## 2 Goals and Contributions

As discussed in Section 1, we will describe new algorithms for generating proofs in an authorization logic that an access request is consistent with required security policy. It will be far easier to discuss our algorithms in the context of a concrete authorization logic, and for this purpose we introduce the logic used in our deployment, borrowed from our previous work [9] and reproduced in full in Appendix A. However, we emphasize that our techniques are not specific to this logic; rather, they can be adapted to a wide range of such logics provided that they build upon a similar notion of delegation, as discussed in Section 7.

Here we describe only the elements of our example logic that are necessary for understanding the rest of this paper. If `pubkey` is a particular public key, then $\mathbf{key}(\texttt{pubkey})$ is the principal that corresponds to that key. If Alice is a principal, we write Alice.`secretary` to denote the principal whom Alice calls "secretary." The formulas of our logic describe principals' beliefs. If Alice believes that the formula $F$ is true, we write Alice $\mathbf{says}$ $F$. To indicate that she believes a formula $F$ is true, a principal signs it with her private

key—the resulting sequence of bits will be represented with the formula $\texttt{pubkey}$ $\mathbf{signed}$ $F$, which can be transformed into a belief using the SAYS-I rule in Appendix A. To describe a resource that a client wants to access, we use the $\mathbf{open}$ constructor. A principal believes the formula $\mathbf{open}(resource)$ if she thinks that it is OK to access $resource$[1]. Delegation is described with the $\mathbf{speaksfor}$ and $\mathbf{delegate}$ predicates. The formula $\mathsf{Alice}$ $\mathbf{speaksfor}$ $\mathsf{Bob}$ indicates that Bob has delegated to Alice his authority to make access-control decisions about any resource. $\mathbf{delegate}(\mathsf{Bob}, \mathsf{Alice}, resource)$ transfers to Alice only the authority to access the resource called $resource$.

## 2.1 Requirements

To motivate our requirements, we use as an example an actual policy in use on a daily basis in our system. All the resources in our example are owned by our academic department, and so to access a resource ($\mathsf{resource}$) one must prove that the department has authorized the access ($\mathsf{Dept}$ $\mathbf{says}$ $\mathbf{open}(\mathsf{resource})$).

Alice is the manager in charge of a machine room with three entrances, $\mathsf{door1}$, $\mathsf{door2}$, and $\mathsf{door3}$. To place her in charge of the machine room, the department has created credentials giving Alice access to each door, e.g., $K_{\mathsf{Dept}}$ $\mathbf{signed}$ $\mathbf{delegate}(\mathsf{Dept}, \mathsf{Alice}, \mathsf{door1})$. Alice's responsibilities include determining which other individuals may access the machine room. Instead of individually delegating access to each door, Alice has decided to organize her security policy by (1) creating a group $\mathsf{Alice.machine\text{-}room}$; (2) giving members of that group access to each machine-room door (e.g., $K_{\mathsf{Alice}}$ $\mathbf{signed}$ $\mathbf{delegate}(\mathsf{Alice}, \mathsf{Alice.machine\text{-}room}, \mathsf{door1})$; and finally (3) making individuals like Bob members of the $\mathsf{machine\text{-}room}$ group ($K_{\mathsf{Alice}}$ $\mathbf{signed}$ $(\mathsf{Bob}$ $\mathbf{speaksfor}$ $\mathsf{Alice.machine\text{-}room}))$).

Suppose that Charlie, who currently does not have access to the machine room, wishes to open one of the machine room doors. Upon his device contacting the door, it is told to prove $\mathsf{Dept}$ $\mathbf{says}$ $\mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$. The proof is likely to require credentials created by the department, by Alice, and also perhaps by Bob, who may be willing to redelegate the authority he received from Alice.

Previous approaches to proof generation in similar scenarios generally did not attempt to address three requirements that are crucial in practice. Each requirement may appear to be a trivial extension of some previously studied proof-generation algorithm. However, straightforward implementation attempts suffer from problems that lead to greater inefficiency than can be tolerated in practice, as will be detailed below.

**Credential creation** Charlie will not be able to access $\mathsf{door1}$ unless Alice, Bob, or the department creates a credential to make that possible. The proof-generation algorithm should intelligently guide users to create the "right" credential, e.g., $K_{\mathsf{Alice}}$ $\mathbf{signed}$ $(\mathsf{Charlie}$ $\mathbf{speaksfor}$ $\mathsf{Alice.machine\text{-}room})$. This increases the computation required, as the prover must additionally investigate branches of reasoning that involve credentials that have not yet been created.

**Exposing choice points** When it is possible to make progress on a proof in a number of ways (i.e., by creating different credentials or by asking different principals for help), the choice points should be exposed to the user instead of being followed automatically. Exposing the choice points to the user makes it possible both to generate proofs more efficiently by taking advantage of the user's knowledge (e.g., Charlie might know that Bob is likely to help him but Alice isn't) and to avoid undesired proving paths (e.g., bothering Alice at 3AM with a request to create credentials, when she has requested she not be). This increase in overall efficiency comes at a cost of increased local computation, as the prover must investigate all possible choice points prior to asking the user.

**Local proving** Our previous work [9] showed that proof generation in distributed environments was

[1] To allow for unique requests, the $\mathbf{open}$ constructor also takes a nonce as a second parameter, which is omitted for simplicity.

feasible under the assumption that each principal attempted to prove only the formulas pertaining to her own beliefs (e.g., Charlie would attempt to prove formulas like $\mathsf{Charlie}\ \mathbf{says}\ F$, but would immediately ask Bob for help if he had to prove $\mathsf{Bob}\ \mathbf{says}\ G$). In our example, if Charlie asks Alice for help, Alice is able to create sufficient credentials to prove $\mathsf{Dept}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$, even though this proof involves reasoning about the department head's beliefs. Avoiding a request to the department head improves the overall efficiency of proof generation, but requires Alice to try to prove all goals for which she would normally ask for help.

The increase in computation imposed by each requirement may seem reasonable, but when implemented as a straightforward extension of our previous work, Alice's prover running on a smartphone will take over 5 *minutes* to determine the set of possible ways in which she can help Charlie gain access. Using the algorithms described in this paper, Alice is able to find the most common options (see Section 5.2) in 2 seconds, and is able to find a provably complete set of options in well less than a minute.

## 2.2 Insights

We address the requirements outlined in Section 2.1 with a new distributed proving algorithm that is both efficient in practice and that sacrifices no proving ability relative to prior approaches. The insights embodied in our new algorithm are threefold, which we describe with the help of the example in Section 2.1.

**Minimizing expensive proof steps** In an effort to prove $\mathsf{Dept}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$, suppose Charlie's prover directs a request for help to Alice. Alice's prover might decompose the goal $\mathsf{Dept}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$ in various ways, some that would require the consent of the user Alice to create a new credential (e.g., $\mathsf{Alice}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathsf{Charlie}\ \mathbf{speaksfor}\ \mathsf{Alice.machine\text{-}room}$) and others that would involve making a remote query (e.g., to Dept, since this is Dept's belief). We have found that naively pursuing such options inline, i.e., when the prover first encounters them, is not reasonable in a practical implementation, as the former requires too much user interaction and the latter induces too much network communication and remote proving.

We present a *delayed* proof procedure that vastly improves on these alternatives for the policies we have experimented with in practice. Roughly speaking, our procedure strategically bypasses formulas that are the most expensive to pursue, i.e., requiring either making a remote query or the local user consenting to signing the formula directly. Each such formula is revisited only if subsequent steps in the proving process show that it proving it would, in fact, be useful to completing the overall proof. In this way, the most expensive steps in the proof process are skipped until only those that would actually be useful are determined. These useful steps may be collected and presented to the user at once to aid in the decision-making process. Our delayed distributed proving algorithm is described further in Section 5.1.

**Precomputing trust relationships** A second insight is to locally precompute and cache trust relationships using two approaches, *forward chaining* [35] and *path compression*. Unlike backward chaining, which recursively decomposes goals into subgoals, these techniques work forward from a prover's available credentials (its *knowledge base*) to derive both facts and trust relationships, e.g., metalogical implications of the form "if we prove that $\mathsf{Charlie}\ \mathbf{says}\ F$, then we can prove that $\mathsf{David}\ \mathbf{says}\ F$". By computing these implications off the critical path, numerous lengthy branches can be avoided during backward chaining.

**Systematic tactic generation** Another set of difficulties in constructing proofs is related to constructing the tactics that guide a backward-chaining prover in how it decomposes a goal into subgoals. One approach to constructing tactics is simply to use the inference rules as the tactics. With a depth-limiter to ensure termination, this approach ensures that all possible proofs up to a certain size will be found, but is typically too inefficient for practical use because it enumerates all possible proof shapes on the critical path. A more

efficient construction is to hand-craft a set of tactics by using multiple inference rules per tactic to create a more specific set of tactics [19]. The tactics tend to be designed to look for certain types of proofs at the expense of completeness. Additionally, the tactics are tedious to construct, and do not lend themselves to formal analysis. While dramatically faster than inference rules, the hand-crafted tactics can still be inefficient, and more importantly, often suffer loss of proving ability when the policy grows larger or deviates from the ones that inspired the tactics.

A third insight of the approach we describe here is a new, *systematic* approach for generating tactics from inference rules. This contribution is enabled by the forward chaining and path compression algorithms mentioned above. In particular, since our prover can rely on the fact that all trust relationships have been precomputed, it need not have tactics that attempt to derive the trust relationships directly from credentials at the time of generating a proof of access. This reduces the difficulty of designing tactics. In our approach, an inference rule having to do with delegation gives rise to two tactics: one whose chief purpose is to look up previously computed trust relationships, and another that identifies the manner in which previously computed trust relationships may be extended by the creation of further credentials. All other inference rules are used directly.

### 2.3 Proposed Algorithm

The prover operates over a *knowledge base* that consists of tactics, locally known credentials, and facts that can be derived from these credentials. The proving strategy we propose consists of three parts. First, a forward-chaining prover extends the local knowledge base with all facts that it can derive from existing knowledge (Section 3). Second, a path-compression algorithm computes trust relationships that can be derived from the local knowledge base but that cannot be derived through forward chaining (Section 4). Third, a backward-chaining prover takes advantage of the knowledge generated by forward chaining and path compression to efficiently compute proofs of a particular goal (e.g., $\mathsf{Dept}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$) (Section 5).

The splitting of the proving process into distinct pieces is motivated by the observation that if Charlie is trying to access door1, he is interested in minimizing the time between the moment he indicates his intention to access door1 and the time he is able to enter. Any part of the proving process that takes place *before* Charlie attempts to access door1 is effectively invisible to him. By completely precomputing certain types of knowledge, the backward-chaining prover can avoid some costly branches of investigation, thus reducing the time the user spends waiting.

## 3 Forward Chaining

Forward chaining (FC) is a proof-search technique in which all known ground facts (true formulas that do not contain free variables) are exhaustively combined using the inference rules until either a proof of the formula contained in the query has been found, or the algorithm has reached a fixed point from which no further inferences can be made. We use a variant of the algorithm known as incremental forward chaining [35] in which state is preserved across queries, allowing the incremental addition of a single fact to the knowledge base. The property we desire from FC is *completeness*—that it finds a proof of every formula for which a proof can be found from the credentials in the knowledge base $KB$. More formally:

**Theorem 1** *After each credential $f \in KB$ has been incrementally added via* FC*, for any $p_1 \ldots p_n \in KB$, if $(p_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge p_n) \supset q$ then $q \in KB$.*

Forward chaining has been shown to be complete for Datalog knowledge bases, which consist of definite clauses without function symbols [35]. Many access-control logics are a subset of, or can be translated into,

Datalog (e.g., [24, 29]). Our sample security logic is not a subset of Datalog because it contains function symbols, but we proceed to show that in certain cases, such as ours, FC is complete for knowledge bases that contain function symbols. The initial knowledge base may be divided into definite clauses that have premises, and those that do not. We refer to these as rules and credentials, respectively. A *fact* is any formula for which a proof exists. A *term* is either a constant, a variable, or a function applied to terms. A *ground* term is a term that does not contain a variable. A function symbol, such as the successor function $s()$ that iterates natural numbers, maps terms to terms. Function symbols present a problem in that they may be used to create infinitely many ground terms (e.g., as with the successor function), which in turn may cause FC to construct an infinite number of ground facts. However, we note that some knowledge bases may contain function symbols, yet lack the proper rules to construct an infinite number of terms.

Our sample security logic is one such knowledge base. The logic makes use of two functions: $\mathbf{key}$ and dot (.). The single inference rule that applies $\mathbf{key}$ is only able to match its premise against a credential. As a result, $\mathbf{key}$ may be applied only once per credential. Dot is used to specify nested names, for which the depth of nesting is not constrained. However, no inference rule has a conclusion with a nested name of depth greater than the depth of any name mentioned in one of its premises. Therefore, the deepest nested name possible for a given $KB$ is the deepest name mentioned explicitly in a credential.

For any knowledge base that constrains function symbols to a finite number of applications, the number of ground facts is finite. If we let $c$ be the number of constants, $f$ the number of function symbols, and $n$ the maximum number applications of a function, the maximum number of terms that can be created is $c^{nf+1}$. Thus, if we let $a$ represent the maximum arity, or number of parameters, of any predicate, $r$ the number of predicates in the logic, the number of ground facts is bound from above by $r(c^{nf+1})^a$. From this point, the proof of completeness is analogous to the one presented by Russell and Norvig [35].

# 4 Path Compression

A *path* is a delegation chain between two principals $A$ and $B$ such that a proof of $A$ **says** $F$ implies that a proof of $B$ **says** $F$ can be found. Some paths are represented directly in the logic (e.g., $B$ **speaksfor** $A$). Other paths, such as the path between $A$ and $C$ that results from the credentials $K_A$ **signed** $(B$ **speaksfor** $A)$ and $K_B$ **signed** $(C$ **speaksfor** $B)$, cannot be expressed directly—they are metalogical constructs, and such cannot be computed by FC. More formally, we define a path as follows:

**Definition 1** *A path* $(A$ **says** $F, B$ **says** $F)$ *is a set of credentials* $c_1, \ldots, c_n$ *and a proof* $P$ *of* $(c_1, \ldots, c_n, A$ **says** $F) \supset B$ **says** $F$.

We introduce a new algorithm, *Path Compression* (PC), that computes all paths that can be derived from known credentials. The algorithm, in essence, compresses arbitrarily long delegation chains into a single step. At a high level, PC operates by maintaining a global list of paths $paths$. When discussing a path $(X, Y)$, we will refer to $X$ as the head of the path and $Y$ as the tail. When PC is invoked with a new credential, it will determine if that credential represents a delegation, and if so, create a new path $\pi$ corresponding to that delegation. PC will attempt to unify the tail of $\pi$ with the head of all paths in $paths$. Whenever the unification succeeds, a new path will be formed using the head of $\pi$ and the tail of the other path and added to a temporary list of paths $newPaths$. PC will then perform the opposite operation: it will attempt to unify the head of $\pi$ with the tail of all paths in $paths$. Whenever the unification succeeds, PC will not only combine the old path with $\pi$, but will also combine the old path with every path in $newPaths$. Finally, $\pi$, $newPaths$, and all of the paths produced in the final step are added to $paths$. In some cases, a credential that contains a delegation can be translated into a path only if another path already exists. We

refer to this type of credential as *dependent*. *Independent* credentials can be translated into a path regardless of what other paths exist. This addition of dependent credentials is described in detail below.

```
0   global set paths                                          /* All known delegation chains */
1   global set incompletePaths                                /* All known incomplete chains */

2   PC(credential f)
3       if (credToPath(f) = ⊥), return                        /* If not a delegation, do nothing. */
4       (x, y) ← depends-on(f)                                /* If input is a third-person
5       if (((x, y) ≠ ⊥) ∧ ¬((x, y) ∈ paths))                    delegation, add it to incompletePaths.*/
6           incompletePaths ← incompletePaths ∪ (f, (x, y))
7           return

8       (p, q) ← credToPath(f)                                /* Convert input credential into a path. */
9       add-path((p, q))

10      foreach (f', (x', y')) ∈ incompletePaths              /* Check if new paths make any previously
11          foreach (p'', q'') ∈ paths                           encountered third-person credentials
12              if((θ ← unify((x', y'), (p'', q''))) ≠ ⊥)        useful. */
13                  (p', q') ← credToPath(f')
14                  add-path((subst(θ, p'), subst(θ, q')))

15  add-path(path (p, q))
16      local set newPaths = {}
17      paths ← union((p, q), paths)                          /* Add the new path to set of paths. */
18      newPaths ← union((p, q), newPaths)

19      foreach (p', q') ∈ paths
20          if((θ ← unify(q, p')) ≠ ⊥)                        /* Try to prepend new path to
21              c ← (subst(θ, p), subst(θ, q'))                  all previous paths. */
22              paths ← union(c, paths)
23              newPaths ← union(c, paths)

24      foreach (p', q') ∈ paths
25          foreach (p'', q'') ∈ newPaths                     /* Try to append all new paths
26              if((θ ← unify(q', p'')) ≠ ⊥)                     to all previous paths. */
27                  c ← (subst(θ, p'), subst(θ, q''))
28                  paths ← union(c, paths)
```

Figure 1: PC, an incremental path-compression algorithm

### 4.1 Path Compression Algorithm

The path compression algorithm, shown in Figure 1, is divided into two subroutines: PC and add-path. The objective of PC is to determine if the given credential represents a meaningful path, and, if so, add it to the set of known paths. add-path is responsible for adding a new path and constructing all other possible paths using this new path. The subroutine subst performs a free-variable substitution and unify returns the most general substitution (if one exists) that, when applied to both parameters, produces equivalent formulas.

PC ignores any credential that does not contain a delegation statement (Line 3 of Figure 1). Some delegation credentials represent a meaningful path only if another path already exists. For example, Alice

could delegate authority to Bob on behalf of Charlie (e.g., Alice $\mathbf{signed\ delegate}$(Charlie, Bob, *resource*)). This credential by itself is meaningless because Alice lacks the authority to speak on Charlie's behalf. We say that this credential *depends on* the existence of a path from Alice to Charlie, because this path would give Alice the authority to speak on Charlie's behalf. If a new credential does not depend on another path, or depends on a path that exists, it will be passed to add-path (Line 9). If the credential depends on a path that does not exist, the credential is instead stored in $incompletePaths$ for later use (Lines 5–7). Whenever a new path is added, PC must check if any of the credentials in $incompletePaths$ are now meaningful (Lines 10–12), and, if so, covert them to paths and add them (Lines 13–14).

After adding the new path to the global set of paths (Line 17), add-path finds the set of already-computed paths that can be appended to the new path, appends them, and adds the resulting paths to the global set (Lines 19–23). Next, add-path finds the set of existing paths that can be prepended to the paths created in the first step, prepends them, and saves the resulting paths (Lines 24–28). To prevent cyclic paths from being saved, the union subroutine adds a path only if it does not represent a cycle. That is, union$((p, q), S)$ returns $S$ if unify$(p, q) \neq \bot$, and $S \cup \{(p, q)\}$ otherwise.

### 4.2 Completeness of PC

The property we desire of PC is that it constructs all possible paths that are derivable from the credentials it has been given as input. We state this formally below; the proof is in Appendix B.

**Theorem 2** *If* PC *has completed on $KB$, then for any $A, B$ such that $A \neq B$, if $(B\ \mathbf{says}\ F \supset A\ \mathbf{says}\ F)$ for some $F$ then $(B\ \mathbf{says}\ F, A\ \mathbf{says}\ F) \in KB$.*

Informally: We first show that add-path will combine all paths that can be combined—that is, for any paths $(p, q)$ and $(p', q')$ if $q$ unifies with $p'$ then the path $(p, q')$ will have been added. We then proceed to show that for all credentials that represent a path, all independent credentials are added, and all credentials that depend on the existence of another path are added whenever that path becomes known.

## 5 Backward Chaining

Backward-chaining provers consist of a set of tactics that describe how formulas might be proved and a backward-chaining engine that uses tactics to prove a particular formula. The backward-chaining part of our algorithm must perform two novel tasks. First, the backward-chaining engine needs to expose choice points to the user. At each such point the user can select, e.g., which of several local credentials to create, or which of several principals to ask for help. Second, we want to craft the tactics to take advantage of facts precomputed through forward chaining and path compression in order to achieve greater efficiency and better coverage of the proof space than previous approaches.

### 5.1 Delayed Backward Chaining

While trying to generate a proof, the prover may investigate subgoals for which user interaction is necessary, e.g., to create a new credential or to determine the appropriate remote party to ask for help. We call these subgoals *choice subgoals*, since they will not be investigated unless the user explicitly chooses to do so. Our previous approach to distributed theorem proving [9] attempted to pursue each choice subgoal as it was discovered, thus restricting user interaction to a series of yes or no questions. Our insight here is to pursue a choice subgoal only after all other choice subgoals have been identified, thus *delaying* the proving of all

choice subgoals until input can be solicited from the user. This affords the user the opportunity to guide the prover by selecting the choice subgoal that is most appropriate to pursue first. As an optimization, after identifying a choice subgoal, the prover may assume a proof of the subgoal exists and attempt to complete the remainder of the proof. This may be used to eliminate from consideration choice subgoals whose proofs will ultimately not be useful.

We present our delayed distributed backward chaining algorithm (bc-ask$_D$, shown in Figure 2) as a modification of our previous distributed backward chaining algorithm [9]. For ease of presentation, bc-ask$_D$ does not additional parameters necessary to to construct a proof term. In practice, the proof is constructed in parallel with the substitution that is returned by bc-ask$_D$.

When we identify a choice subgoal, we construct a *marker* to store the parameters necessary to make the remote request. A marker differs from a choice subgoal in that a choice subgoal is a formula, while a marker has the same type as a proof.[2] This allows a marker to be included as a subproof in a larger proof. For ease of formal comparison with our previous work, the algorithm we present here is only capable of creating markers for remote subgoals; we describe a trivial modification to allow it to handle locally creatable credentials.

bc-ask$_D$ operates by recursively decomposing the original goal into subgoals. The base case occurs when bc-ask$_D$ is invoked with an empty goal, in which case bc-ask$_D$ will determine if the current solution has been previously marked as a failure and return appropriately (Lines 3–4). For non-empty goals, bc-ask$_D$ will determine if the formula represents the beliefs of a remote principal using the determine-location subroutine (Line 6), which returns either the constant $localmachine$ or the address of the remote principal. If the formula is remote, rather than making a remote procedure call, we create a marker and return (Lines 8–10).

If the formula is local or the choice subgoal represented by the remote marker was previously investigated (indicated by the marker's presence in $failures$), bc-ask$_D$ will attempt to prove the goal either directly from a credential, or via the application of a tactic to the goal (Lines 11–12). bc-ask$_D$ handles the case where the goal is directly provable from a credential (Lines 14–17) separately from the case where it is not (Lines 18–22) only to allow the credential to be appended to the return tuple (Line 17). When the goal is directly provable from a credential, bc-ask$_D$ first performs the same function as the base case without recursing, then attempts to prove the remainder of the goals. If bc-ask$_D$ applied a tactic, it attempts to recursively prove the premises of that tactic (Line 18). If this results in a remote marker, bc-ask$_D$ suspends proving and returns (Line 20). Otherwise, bc-ask$_D$ attempts to recursively prove the remainder of the goals (Lines 21–22).

**Locally creatable credentials** We can extend bc-ask$_D$ to support the creation of local credentials by the addition of a section of code prior to Line 11 that, similarly to Lines 8–10, creates a marker when the first goal is a locally creatable credential. Line 20 suspends proving only for remote markers, so bc-ask$_D$ will attempt to complete the proof to determine if creating the credential will lead to a complete proof.

**Suspending proving for remote markers** For theoretical completeness, we must suspend proving after the addition of a remote marker is that the response to a remote request may add credentials to the local knowledge base which in turn increase our ability to prove of the remainder of the proof. Rather than enumerating all possible ways in which the remainder of the proof might be proved, we simply suspend the investigation of this branch of the proof once a remote marker has been created. If the user decides to make a remote request then, upon receipt of the response to this request, we will add any new credentials to the knowledge base and re-run the original query. In this manner, multiple *rounds* of proving can be used to find proofs that would involve more than one choice subgoal.

[2] In Figure 2, a marker is typed as a substitution — this is because, as shown, bc-ask$_D$ does not construct proof terms. We will refer to a marker as having the same type as a proof to foster an intuition that is consistent with the implementation.

```
0   global set KB                                              /* knowledge base */

1   ⟨substitution, credential[ ]⟩ bc-ask_D(
        list goals,                                            /* list of conjuncts forming a query */
        substitution θ,                                        /* current substitution, initially empty */
        set failures)                                          /* set of substitutions that are known
                                                                  not to produce a complete solution */
2       local set failures'                                    /* local copy of failures */

3       if (goals = [ ] ∧ θ ∈ failures) then return ⊥          /* θ known not to produce global solution */
4       if (goals = [ ]) then return ⟨θ, [ ]⟩                  /* base case, solution has been found */
5       q' ← subst(θ, first(goals))

6       l ← determine-location(q')
7       failures' ← failures

8       if (l ≠ localmachine)                                  /* if q' is the belief of a remote principal */
9           m ← constructMarker(first(goals), θ, failures')
10          if ¬(m ∈ failures'), return ⟨m, [ ]⟩

11      foreach (P, q) ∈ KB                                    /* investigate each fact, tactic */
12          if ((θ' ← unify(q, q')) ≠ ⊥)                       /* determine if tactic matches first goal */
13              φ ← compose(θ', θ)
14              if (P = [ ])                                   /* if (P, q) represents a credential */
15                  if ¬(φ ∈ failures')
16                      failures' ← φ ∪ failures'
17                      ⟨answer, creds⟩ ← bc-ask_D(rest(goals), φ, failures)   /* prove remainder of goals */
18                      if(answer ≠ ⊥) return ⟨answer, [creds|q]⟩              /* append q to creds and return */
19              else while ((⟨β, creds⟩ ← bc-ask_D(P, φ, failures')) ≠ ⊥)   /* prove subgoals */
20                  failures' ← β ∪ failures'                  /* prevent β from being returned again */
21                  if (isRemoteMarker(β)), return ⟨β, [ ]⟩
22                  ⟨answer, creds⟩ ← bc-ask_D(rest(goals), β, failures)   /* prove remainder of goals */
23                  if (answer ≠ ⊥) then return ⟨answer, creds⟩            /* if answer found, return it */

24      return ⟨⊥, [ ]⟩                                        /* if no proof found, return failure */
```

Figure 2: bc-ask$_D$, a delayed version of bc-ask

In practice, we expect that proofs requiring multiple rounds will be encountered infrequently — in fact, they have not arisen in our deployment. Based on the assumption that multiple rounds are seldom necessary, we introduce an optimization in which the prover, after adding a marker, attempts to complete the remainder of the proof from local knowledge. Using this knowledge, we can bias the user's decision towards choices that produce a complete proof in a single round and away from choices that may never lead to a complete solution.

### 5.1.1 Completeness of delayed backward chaining

A delayed backward chaining prover offers strictly greater proving ability than an inline backward chaining prover. This is stated more formally below; the proof is in Appendix C.

**Theorem 3** *For any goal $G$, a delayed distributed prover with local knowledge base $KB$ will find a proof of $G$ if an inline distributed prover using $KB$ will find a proof of $G$.*

Informally, to prove Theorem 3, we first show that in the absence of any markers, the delayed prover will find a proof if the inline prover finds a proof. We then extend this result to allow remote markers, but under the assumption that any remote request made by the delayed prover will produce the same answer as an identical remote request made by the inline prover. Finally, we relax this assumption to show that the delayed prover has strictly greater proving ability than the inline prover.

## 5.2 Tactics

In constructing a set of tactics to be used by our backward-chaining engine, we have two goals: the tactics should make use of facts precomputed by FC and PC, and they should be generated systematically from the inference rules of the logic.

If a formula $F$ can be proved from local credentials, and all locally known credentials have been incrementally added via FC, then, by Theorem 1, a proof of $F$ already exists in the knowledge base. In this case, the backward-chaining component of our prover need only look in the knowledge base to find the proof. Tactics are thus used only when $F$ is not provable from local knowledge, and in that case their role is to identify choice subgoals to present to the user.

Since the inference rules that describe delegation are the ones that indirectly give rise to the paths precomputed by PC, we need to treat those specially when generating tactics; all other inference rules are imported as tactics directly. We discuss here only delegation rules with two premises; for further discussion see Section 7.

Inference rules about delegation typically have two premises: one that describes a delegation, and another that allows the delegated permission to be exercised. As per the above discussion, one of the premises must contain a choice subgoal. For each delegation rule, we construct two tactics: (1) a *left* tactic for the case when the choice subgoal is in the delegation premise, (2) a *right* tactic for the case when the choice subgoal is in the other premise.[3]

The insight behind the left tactic is that instead of looking for complete proofs of the delegation premise in cache, it looks for proofs among the paths precomputed by PC, thus allowing us to follow an arbitrarily long delegation chain in one step. The premise exercising the delegation is then proved normally, by recursively applying tactics to find any remaining choice subgoals. The right tactic, on the other hand, assumes that the delegation premise can be proved only with the use of a choice subgoal, and therefore restricts the search to only those proofs. The right tactic may then look in the knowledge base for a proof of the right premise in an effort to determine if the choice subgoal is ultimately useful to pursue.

In Figure 3 we show an inference rule and the two tactics we construct from that rule. All tactics are constructed as *prove* predicates, thus a recursive call to prove may apply tactics other than the two shown. The *factLookup* and *pathLookup* predicates inspect the knowledge base for facts produced by FC and paths produced by PC, respectively. The *proveWithChoiceSubgoal* acts like a standard prove predicate, but restricts the search such that it discards any proofs that do not involve a choice subgoal. In practice, each of these restrictions can be accomplished through additional parameters to $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ that restrict what types of proof may be returned. In the situation where a right rule (e.g., the one in Figure 3) may be applied repeatedly, we employ rudimentary cycle detection.

[3]For completeness, if there are choice subgoals in both premises, one will be resolved and then the prover will be rerun (see Section 5.1 for details). In practice, we have yet to encounter a circumstance where a single round of proving was not sufficient.

$$\frac{A \textbf{ says } (B \textbf{ speaksfor } A) \quad B \textbf{ says } F}{A \textbf{ says } F} \text{ (SPEAKSFOR-E)}$$

*left tactic*:
prove($A$ **says** $F$) :-
  pathLookup($B$ **says** $F$, $A$ **says** $F$),
  prove($B$ **says** $F$).

*right tactic*:
prove($A$ **says** $F$) :-
  proveWithChoiceSubgoal($A$ **says** ($B$ **speaksfor** $A$)),
  factLookup($B$ **says** $F$).

Figure 3: Example construction of LR tactics from an inference rule

**Optimizations to LR** The dominant computational cost of running a query using LR tactics occurs through repeated applications of right tactics. Since a right tactic handles the case in which the choice subgoal represents a delegation, identifying the choice subgoal involves determining who is allowed to create delegations, and then determining on whose behalf that person wishes to delegate. This involves exhaustively searching through all paths twice. However, practical experience with our deployed system indicates that people rarely delegate on behalf of anyone other than themselves. This allows us to remove the second path application and trade completeness for speed in finding the most common proofs. If completeness is desired, the optimized algorithm could be run first, and the complete version could be run afterwards. We refer to the optimized tactics as LR′. Note that this type of optimization is made dramatically easier because of the systematic approach used to construct the LR tactics.

**Alternative approaches to caching** Naive constructions of tactics perform a large amount of redundant computation both within a query and across queries. An apparent solution to this problem would be to cache intermediate results as they are discovered so as to avoid future recomputation. As it turns out, this type of caching does not improve performance, and even worsens it in some situations. This is due to the nature of backward chaining. If attempting to prove a formula with an unbound variable, an exhaustive search requires that all bindings for that variable be investigated. Cached proofs will be used first, but as the cache is not necessarily all-inclusive, tactics must be applied as well. These tactics in turn will rederive the proofs that are in cache. Another approach is to make caching part of the proving engine (e.g., Prolog) itself. Tabling algorithms [16] provide this and other useful properties, and have well-established implementations [3]. However, this approach precludes adding proofs to cache that are discovered via different proving techniques (e.g., FC, PC, or a remote prover using a different set of tactics).

### 5.2.1 Completeness of LR

Despite greater efficiency, LR tactics have strictly greater proving ability than the depth-limited inference rules. We state this formally below; the proof is in Appendix D.

**Theorem 4** *Given one prover whose tactics are depth-limited inference rules (*IR*), and a second prover that uses* LR *tactics in conjunction with* FC *and* PC*, if the prover using* IR *tactics finds a proof of goal $F$, the prover using* LR *tactics will find a proof of $F$ as well.*

Informally, to prove Theorem 4, we first show show that provers using LR and IR are locally equivalent—that is, if IR finds a complete proof from local knowledge then LR will do so as well and if IR inserts a marker then LR will insert the same marker. We show this by first noting that if IR finds a complete proof from local knowledge, then a prover using LR will have precomputed that same proof using FC. We show that LR and IR produce the same markers by induction over the size of the proof explored by IR and noting that

left tactics handle the case where the marker is for the right premise of an inference rule and that right tactics handle the case where the marker is for the left premise of an inference rule. Having shown local equivalence, we can apply induction over the number of remote requests made to conclude that a prover using LR will find a proof of $F$ if a prover using IR finds a proof of $F$.

# 6 Empirical Evaluation

Since the usability of the distributed access-control system as a whole depends on the timeliness with which it can generate a proof of access, the most important evaluation metric is the amount of time it takes to construct either a complete proof, or, if no complete proof can be found, to generate a list of choices to give to the user. As secondary metrics, we consider the number of subgoals investigated by the prover and the size of the knowledge base produced by FC and PC. The number of subgoals investigated represents a coarse measure of efficiency that is independent of any particular Prolog implementation.

We compare the performance of five proving strategies: three that represent previous work and two (the combination of FC and PC with either LR or LR′) that represent the proving strategy introduced in this paper. The strategies that represent previous work are backward chaining with depth-limited inference rules (IR), inference rules with basic cycle detection (IR-NC), and hand-crafted tactics (HC). HC evolved from IR over the duration of our deployment as an effort to improve the efficiency of the proof-generation process. As such, HC represents our best effort to optimize a prover that uses only backward chaining to the policies used in our deployment, but at a cost of theoretical completeness.

We analyze two scenarios: the first representing the running example presented previously (which is drawn from our deployment), and the second representing the policy described in our previous work [9], which is indicative of a larger deployment. As explained in Section 6.2, these large policies represent the most challenging environment for our algorithm.

Our system is built using Java Mobile Edition (J2ME), and the prover is written in Prolog. We perform simulations on two devices: a Nokia N70 smartphone, which is the device used in our deployment, and a dual 2.8 Ghz Xeon workstation with 1 GB of memory. Our Prolog interpreter for the N70 is JIProlog [1] due to its compatibility with J2ME. Simulations run on the workstation use SWI-Prolog [2].

## 6.1 Running Example

**Scenario** As per our running example, Alice is a manager that controls access to a machine room. The scenario that we simulate is one in which Charlie wishes to enter the machine room for the first time. In order to do so, his prover will be asked to generate a proof of $\mathsf{Dept}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$. His prover will immediately realize that Dept should be asked for help, but will continue to reason about this formula using local knowledge in the hope of finding a proof without making a request. Lacking sufficient authority, this local reasoning will fail, and Charlie will be presented with the option to ask the department for help. Preferring not to bother the department head, Charlie will decide to ask his manager, Alice, directly.

The construction of a complete proof in this scenario requires three steps: (1) Charlie's prover attempts to construct a proof, realizes that help is necessary, and asks Alice, (2) Alice constructs a proof containing a delegation to Charlie, and (3) Charlie assembles Alice's response into a final proof. As Alice's phone holds the most complicated policy, step 2 dominates the total time required to find a proof.

**Policy** The policy for this scenario is expressed directly in the credentials known to Alice and Charlie; these are shown in Figures 4 and 5. The first six credentials of Figure 4 represent the delegation of access to the machine room doors from the department to Alice, and her redelegation of these resources to the

group Alice.machine-room. Credentials 6-8 indicate that Alice has added Bob, David, and Elizabeth to Alice.machine-room. Notably, Alice has not yet created a credential that would give Charlie access to the machine room. We will analyze the policy as is, and with the addition of a credential that adds Charlie to the machine-room group in a manner similar to that of Bob, David, and Elizabeth. Credentials 9-11 deal with other resources that Alice can access. The final credential is given to Alice when Charlie asks her for help: it indicates Charlie's desire to open door1.

Charlie's policy (Figure 5) is much simpler. He has access to a shared lab space through his membership in the group Dept.residents, to which the department has delegated access. He has no credentials pertaining to the machine room.

Of the credentials shown in Figures 4 and 5, the only credential that was created at the time of access is the one indicating Charlie's desire to access door1. This means that FC and PC have already been run on all other credentials.

0 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (**delegate**(Dept,Alice,door1))
1 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (**delegate**(Dept,Alice,door2))
2 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (**delegate**(Dept,Alice,door3))
3 $K_{\text{Alice}}$ **signed delegate**(Alice, Alice.machine-room, door1)
4 $K_{\text{Alice}}$ **signed delegate**(Alice, Alice.machine-room, door2)
5 $K_{\text{Alice}}$ **signed delegate**(Alice, Alice.machine-room, door3)
6 $K_{\text{Alice}}$ **signed** (Bob **speaksfor** Alice.machine-room)
7 $K_{\text{Alice}}$ **signed** (David **speaksfor** Alice.machine-room)
8 $K_{\text{Alice}}$ **signed** (Elizabeth **speaksfor** Alice.machine-room)

9 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed delegate**(Dept,Alice,office)
10 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (**delegate**(Dept,Dept.residents,lab-door))
11 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (Alice **speaksfor** Dept.residents)

12 $K_{\text{Charlie}}$ **signed open**(door1)

Figure 4: Credentials on Alice's phone

13 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (**delegate**(Dept,Dept.residents,lab-door))
14 $K_{\text{Dept}}$ **signed** (Charlie **speaksfor** Dept.residents)
15 $K_{\text{Charlie}}$ **signed open**(door1)

Figure 5: Credentials on Charlie's phone

**Performance** Figure 6 describes the proving performance experienced by Alice when she attempts to help Charlie. We show performance for both the case where Alice has not yet created the credential that delegates authority Charlie by giving him membership in the group Alice.machine-room, and the case where Alice has already created this credential. In both cases, Alice's phone is unable to complete a proof with either IR or IR-NC as both crash due to lack of memory after a significant amount of computation. To demonstrate the relative performance of IR and IR-NC, Figure 6 includes the simulation results collected on a workstation[4].

In the scenario where Alice has not yet delegated authority to Charlie, HC is over six times slower than LR, and more than two orders of magnitude slower than LR′. If Alice has already added Charlie to the group, the difference in performance widens. Since FC finds all complete proofs, it finds the proof while processing the credentials supplied by Charlie, so the subsequent search by LR and LR′ is a cache lookup. The result is that a proof is found by LR and LR′ almost 60 times faster than HC. When run on the workstation, IR and IR-NC are substantially slower than even HC.

Figure 7 shows the total time required to generate a proof of access in the scenario where Alice must reactively create the delegation credential (IR and IR-NC are omitted as they crash). This consists of Charlie's initial attempt to generate a proof, Alice's proof generation that leads to the creation of a new credential, and Charlie assembling Alice's reply into a final proof. In overall computation, HC is six times slower than LR and 60 times slower than LR′. This does not include the time need for Charlie's help request to arrive on Alice's phone, or the time spent waiting for users to choose between different options.

Since computation time is dependent on the Prolog implementation, as a more general metric of efficiency we also measure the number of formulas investigated by each strategy. Figure 8 shows both the total number of formulas investigated (including redundant computation) and the number of unique formulas investigated. LR and LR′ not only investigate fewer unique formulas than previous approaches, but drastically reduce the amount of redundant computation.

[4]IR, IR-NC, and HC were run with a depth-limit of 7, chosen high enough to find all solutions on this policy.




Figure 6: Alice's prover generates complete proof or list of credentials that Alice can create




Figure 7: Aggregate proving time: Charlie's before help request + Alice's + Charlie's after help request

## 6.2 Large Policies

Although our policy is a real one used in practice, in a widespread deployment it is likely that policies will become more complicated, with users having credentials for dozens of resources spanning multiple administrative domains. However, the prover will perform the worst when all of the credentials are relevant to a single policy (explained below), and as such we evaluate the scalability of our algorithm to larger policies by running our algorithm on the policy described in our previous work [9].

When considering policies with a large number of credentials, we note that every credential that is added decreases the speed with which Prolog can unify against the knowledge base. However, by nature, backward chaining will only consider branches, and hence credentials, that are relevant to the goal at hand. As such, given a fixed number of extra credentials, the backward chaining component of our prover will do the most work when those credentials are relevant to the goal it is trying to prove.

FC and PC are, however, not constrained to only performing computation relevant to a specific goal. They are instead constrained by the ways in which sets of credentials may be combined. While it is possible that credentials from different policies could be combined to produce a great number of useless facts or paths, we feel that this scenario is unlikely.




Figure 8: Number of formulas investigated by Alice




Figure 9: An access-control policy based on the collected policy of our department and scaled to university size [9]

In light of this, the most challenging environment for our prover will be one in which all credentials belong to the same policy, e.g., the policy described in our previous work [9].

This policy (Shown in Figure 9) is based on the current policy in use by the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department of Carnegie Mellon University, but is modified for use in a digital access-control system and scaled to represent an entire university. In this policy, all resources are under the control of the university master key. Due to it's importance, the master key is used only to delegate all authority to a separate signing key. The university runs a certification authority, whose job is to bind names to public keys. Authority is delegated to roles (e.g., ECE Department Head) or names (e.g., CMU's Alice), but never directly to a user's public key. The university delegates authority to the department heads, who delegate authority to floor managers, who in turn delegate to individual users.

We wish to simulate the performance of our approach on this policy from the standpoint of a floor manager who has access to a resource via a delegation chain of length three, and wants to extend this authority to one of her subordinates. The number of credentials the manager has is related to the number of subordinates $s$ by the formula $9 + 7 \cdot s$. Figure 10 shows the performance of the different strategies for different numbers of subordinates on the workstation.

For these policies, the depth limit used by IR, IR-NC, and HC must be 10 or greater. However, IR crashed at any depth limit higher than 7, and is therefore not included in these simulations. A depth limit of 10 was used for simulations on this policy. IR-NC displays the worst performance on the first three policy sizes, and exhausts available memory and crashes for the two largest policy sizes. HC appears to outperform LR, but as the legend indicates, HC was unable able to find 11 out of the 14 possible solutions, including several likely completions; the most notable of which is the desired completion Alice **says** (Charlie **speaksfor** Alice.machine-room). This completion is included in the subset of common solutions that LR′ is looking for. This subset constitutes 43% of the total solution space, and LR′ finds all of the solutions in this subset in several orders of magnitude less time than any other strategy.

The size of the knowledge base for each policy is shown in Figure 11. The knowledge base consists of certificates and, under LR and LR′, facts and paths precomputed by FC and PC, respectively. In practice, many credentials cannot be combined with each other, yielding a knowledge base whose size is approximately linear with respect to the number of credentials. For the scenarios tested, the size of the knowledge base has not hindered performance directly.




Figure 10: Proof generation in larger policies with missing credential




Figure 11: Size of knowledge base in larger policies with missing credential

In summary, the two previous theoretically complete approaches (IR and IR-NC) are unable to scale to the larger policies due to efficiency reasons. HC, tailored to run on a particular policy, is unable to find a significant number of solutions when used on larger policies. LR is able to scale to larger policies while offering theoretical completeness guarantees. LR′, restricted to finding a common subset of solutions, finds all of those solutions dramatically faster than any other algorithm.

# 7 Generality of Our Approach

Although we described and evaluated our algorithm with respect to a particular access-control logic and type of policy, it can be applied to other logics and policies as well. There are two aspects of generality to consider: the ability of our algorithms to support the logical constructs used by other logics, and our ability to perform efficiently when using different policies.

**Applicability** When considering the applicability of our approach to other logics, we must consider individually the applicability of each component of our approach: FC, PC, and the generation of LR tactics.

We have only considered our algorithm with respect to monotonic authorization logics — that is, logics where a provable formula remains provable when given additional credentials. This constraint is commonly used in practical access-control systems (cf. [14]).

As discussed previously, to ensure that the forward-chaining component of our prover terminates, the logic it is operating on should be a subset of Datalog. If function symbols are allowed, their use must be constrained (as described in Section 3). This is sufficient to express most access-control logics, e.g., the logics of SD3, Cassandra [11], and Binder [17], but not sufficient to express high-order logic, and, as such, we cannot fully express the access-control logic presented by Appel and Felten [6].

The general notion of delegation introduced in Definition 1 is conceptually very similar to that of the various logics that encode SPKI [4, 29, 23], the RT family of logics [30], Binder [17], Placeless Documents [8], and the domain-name service logic of SD3 [24].

An assumption of our path-compression algorithm and our method for generating LR tactics is that any delegation rule (e.g., SPEAKSFOR-E in Appendix A) has exactly two premises, which is consistent with our general notion of delegation. Several of the logics mentioned above (e.g., [24, 17, 8]) have delegation rules involving three premises; however, these rules collapse multiple distinct concepts into a single rule (e.g., delegating to a group and assigning group membership), and can thus be rewritten to have at most two premises per rule. We have not thoroughly investigated the case where it is not possible to rewrite delegation rules to have at most two premises.

Generally speaking, for path compression to work, there must be a decidable algorithm for computing the intersection of two permissions. That is, when combining the paths $(\mathsf{Alice}\ \mathbf{says}\ F, \mathsf{Bob}\ \mathbf{says}\ F)$ and $(\mathsf{Bob}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1}), \mathsf{Charlie}\ \mathbf{says}\ \mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1}))$, we need to determine the proper intersection of $F$ and $\mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$ for the resulting path $(\mathsf{Alice}\ \mathbf{says}\ ???, \mathsf{Charlie}\ \mathbf{says}\ ???)$. For our logic, computing the permission is trivial, since in the most complicated case we combine an uninstantiated formula $F$ with a fully instantiated formula, e.g., $\mathbf{open}(\mathsf{door1})$. In some cases, a different algorithm may be appropriate: for SPKI, for example, the algorithm is a type of string intersection [18].

**Efficiency** Our algorithms should be of most benefit in systems where a) credentials can be created dynamically, b) credentials are distributed between many parties, c) long chains of delegation exist, and d) credentials are frequently reused in proofs.

Delayed backward chaining is effective at reducing the number of expensive subgoals that must be pursued, thus improving performance in systems with properties (a) and (b). Long delegation chains (c) can

effectively be compressed using either FC (if the result of the compression can be expressed directly in the logic) or PC (when the result cannot be expressed in the logic). FC and PC extend the knowledge base with the results of their computation, thus allowing reuse of the results at minimal future cost (d).

These four properties are not unique to our system, and so we expect our algorithms, or the insights they embody, will be useful elsewhere. For example, Greenpass [21] allows for users to dynamically create credentials. Properties (b) and (c) have been the focus of considerable previous work, notably SPKI [4, 29, 23], the DNS logic of SD3 [24], RT [30], and Cassandra [11]. Finally, we feel that property (d) is common to the vast majority of access-control systems, as a statement of delegation is typically intended to be reused.

**Other applications** A secondary benefit of dividing proving into forward chaining, path compression, and backward chaining is that forward-chaining and path-compression provide potentially very useful tools to help a user understand the effects of a policy that she is creating. For example, if Alice wants to create a new credential $K_{\mathsf{Alice}}$ $\mathbf{signed\ delegate}(\mathsf{Alice}, \mathsf{Alice.machine\text{-}room}, \mathsf{door4})$, running this hypothetical credential through the path-compression algorithm could inform Alice that an effect of the new credential is that Bob now has access to door4 (i.e., that a path for door4 was created from Bob to Alice). Accomplishing an equivalent objective using IR or IR-NC would involve assuming that everyone is willing to access every resource, and attempting to prove access to every resource in the system—a very inefficient process.

# 8 Related Work

Many recent distributed access-control systems (of which Taos [5] is an early example) model access-control decisions in a formal logic. Mechanisms for collecting information for access-control decisions falls, roughly speaking, into two categories: remote credential retrieval and distributed reasoning. We briefly describe these here; however, we are aware of no previous algorithm that meets all of our requirements, and no works that analyze the performance of the distributed proving alternatives we consider.

PolicyMaker [13], allows access-control policies to be represented by arbitrary programs, which can potentially lead to intractable access-control decisions. KeyNote [14, 12] addresses this issue by constraining the programs that express policy. KeyNote allows the specification of policies that involve remote credentials. In the Strongman [27] architecture, administrative domain policies, expressed as KeyNote programs, are enforced in a distributed fashion, yielding improved scalability in a distributed firewall setting.

Several systems support remote credential retrieval; we highlight a few here. SD3 [24] is a distributed trust-management framework that extends the evaluation techniques of QCM [22, 25] to introduce the notion of certified evaluation. SD3 retrieves remote credentials in response to queries and pushes credentials between nodes automatically, without the user's knowledge. SPKI (and previously SDSI) [18] is a syntax for digital certificates dealing with authentication. This syntax, which has been modeled in formal logic [4, 29, 23], allows principals to define local namespaces, these namespaces to be linked, and authorization credentials to be chained together to convey the set of permissions in the intersection of each credential's permissions. Maywah [32] implements SPKI-based access control for web pages.

Li et al. introduce RT [31], a language for defining trust in a distributed system. They present a goal-directed graph-based search algorithm for evaluating access-control decisions that is capable of retrieving remote credentials when necessary. PeerAccess [36] provides a framework for describing policies that govern interactions between principals. PeerAccess uses proof hints to restrict whom a principal may ask when local knowledge is insufficient to construct a proof. In contrast, our approach seeks to leverage the user's intuition in such circumstances. Know [26] is a system for providing user feedback when access is denied; meta-policies are used to govern what information about policies is revealed to whom.

Proof-carrying authorization [6] expresses security logics in high-order logic. A formal proof of authorization from signed credentials is submitted with each access request, reducing the role of the resource monitor to that of an efficient proof checker (e.g., [7]). The PCA framework has been used to guard access to web content [10]. In that system, the client requesting access has a theorem prover that is capable of retrieving remote credentials and using them to construct a proof that access should be granted.

Other systems that support remote credential retrieval include Cassandra [11], and Greenpass [21]. Cassandra supports distributed mutli-domain policies that are expressable via Datalog with constraints, e.g., the security policy for the UK's Electronic Health Record system, and retrieves remote credentials as needed. Greenpass is a system built on SPKI/SDSI that enables users of the Dartmouth wireless network to delegate access, e.g., to campus visitors. As an operational system, Greenpass also confronts issues of engaging human users to gain consent for granting credentials, and additionally contemplates credential retrieval in support of authorization decisions. Binder [17] expresses security policy in Datalog, and uses digitally signed credentials to pass context between nodes. Similarly to PCA, Binder can construct proofs from digitally signed credentials, and use these proofs to demonstrate that access should be granted.

The second category of systems supports distributed reasoning about access-control policies. This approach allows the remote retrieval of subproofs rather than credentials, which we previously showed substantially reduces the number of remote requests necessary to complete a proof [9]. Minami et al. [33] demonstrate that this approach is effective in addressing context-sensitive authorization queries, and extend the algorithm to provide distributed cache consistency in the face of certificate revocation [34].

# 9 Conclusion

In this paper we presented a new approach to generating proofs that accesses comply with access-control policy. Our algorithm is targeted for environments in which credentials must be collected from distributed components, perhaps only after users of those components consent to their creation, and our design is informed by such a testbed we have deployed and actively use at our institution. Our algorithm embodies three contributions, namely: novel approaches to identifying and eliminating proof steps that involve remote queries or user interaction and that are unlikely to help reach a proof; methods for inferring trust relationships off the critical path of accesses but that significantly optimize proving during accesses; and systematic approaches to generating tactics that yield efficient backward chaining. We presented both analytical and empirical results for our algorithm that demonstrate its improvements over prior work, the latter using policies in use in our testbed.

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# A Our Authorization Logic

The formulas of our logic are described by the following syntax:

$$\begin{aligned} \phi &::= s \ \mathbf{signed}\ \phi' \mid p \ \mathbf{says}\ \phi' \\ \phi' &::= \mathbf{open}\ (s) \mid p \ \mathbf{speaksfor}\ p \mid \mathbf{delegate}(p, p, s) \end{aligned}$$

where $s$ ranges over strings and $p$ principals. Note that the **says** and **signed** predicates are the only formulas that can occur at the top level.

The inference rules of our logic are natural, and we state them here without further explanation.

$$\frac{pubkey \ \mathbf{signed}\ F}{\mathbf{key}(pubkey) \ \mathbf{says}\ F} \quad \text{(SAYS-I)} \qquad \frac{A \ \mathbf{says}\ (B \ \mathbf{speaksfor}\ A) \quad B \ \mathbf{says}\ F}{A \ \mathbf{says}\ F} \quad \text{(SPEAKSFOR-E)}$$

$$\frac{A \ \mathbf{says}\ (A.S \ \mathbf{says}\ F)}{A.S \ \mathbf{says}\ F} \quad \text{(SAYS-LN)} \qquad \frac{A \ \mathbf{says}\ (B \ \mathbf{speaksfor}\ A.S) \quad B \ \mathbf{says}\ F}{A.S \ \mathbf{says}\ F} \quad \text{(SPEAKSFOR-E2)}$$

$$\frac{A \ \mathbf{says}\ (\mathbf{delegate}(A, B, U)) \quad B \ \mathbf{says}\ (\mathbf{open}(U))}{A \ \mathbf{says}\ (\mathbf{open}(U))} \quad \text{(DELEGATE-E)}$$

# B Completeness of PC

At a high level, we first show that add-path will combine all paths that can be combined—that is, for any paths $(p, q)$ and $(p', q')$ if $q$ unifies with $p'$ then the path $(p, q')$ will have been added. As mentioned in Section 4.1, union is defined to prevent cyclic paths (i.e., $(p, p)$) from ever being added. We then proceed to show that for all credentials that represent a path, all independent credentials are added, and all credentials that depend on the existence of another path are added whenever that path becomes known.

For the purpose of clarity, within the scope of this Appendix, if $\mathsf{unify}(a, b) \neq \bot$ then we will write $a = b$ and use $a$ and $b$ interchangeably. We let [k$p$] represent line k in PC, and [k$a$] represent line k in add-path.

**Lemma 1** *If $paths$ and $incompletePaths$ are initially empty, and* add-path *is invoked repeatedly with a series of inputs, then after any invocation of* add-path *completes, the following holds:* $\forall(x, y) \in paths, \forall(x', y') \in paths, (\mathsf{unify}(y', x) \neq \bot) \supset (x', y) \in paths$.

*Proof* We prove Lemma 1 by induction over the number of calls $i$ that have been made to add-path, where a call corresponds to the addition of a single credential. Our induction hypothesis states that condition $\mathcal{C}$ holds after $i - 1$ calls, where $\mathcal{C}$ is $(\forall(x, y) \in paths, \forall(x', y') \in paths, (\mathsf{unify}(y', x) \neq \bot) \supset (x', y) \in paths)$.

**Base case:** The base case occurs when $i = 1$. Prior to this call, $paths$ is empty. Since $[17a]$ will add $(p, q)$ to $paths$ and $\mathsf{unify}(p, q) = \perp$ (or else credToPath would have returned $\perp$ on $[3p]$) the if statements on $[20a]$ and $[26a]$ will fail and the function will exit with $paths$ containing the single element $(p, q)$. Since $paths$ will contain a single element, the induction hypothesis holds.
**Inductive case:** For the inductive case, we must show that $\mathcal{C}$ holds after the $i$th call to add-path. We prove the inductive case by first making the following observations:
*Observation 1:* By the time $[24a]$ is reached, if $(p, q)$ is the parameter to add-path ($[15a]$), then $paths$ and $newPaths$ will contain every path $(p, q')$ such that $\mathsf{unify}(q, p') \neq \perp$ and $(p', q') \in paths$.
*Observation 2:* When add-path terminates, $paths$ will contain every $(p', q'')$ such that $(p', q') \in paths$, $(p'', q'') \in newPaths$, and $\mathsf{unify}(q', p'') \neq \perp$.
*Observation 3:* If an invocation of add-path, when given input parameter $(p, q)$, adds the path $(x, y)$, then, ignoring the mechanics of add-path, $(x, y)$ must be characterized by one of the following:

1. $(x, y) = (p, q)$
2. $x = p$ and $(q, y) \in paths$ prior to invocation $i$
3. $(x, p) \in paths$ prior to invocation $i$ and $y = q$
4. $(x, p) \in paths$ prior to invocation $i$ and $(q, y) \in paths$ prior to invocation $i$

In situation 2, $(x, y)$ represents the addition of an existing path to one end of $(p, q)$. Situation 3 is simply the opposite of 2. In situation 4, $(x, y)$ represents the addition of existing path to both ends of $(p, q)$.

We must show that $\mathcal{C}$ holds in the following cases, which describe all possible combinations of $(x, y)$ and $(x', y')$ prior to invocation $i$:

1. $(x, y) \in paths, (x', y') \in paths$;
2. $(x', y') \in paths$ but $(x, y) \notin paths$ (or, conversely, that $(x, y) \in paths$ but $(x', y') \notin paths$);
3. $(x, y) \notin paths$ and $(x', y') \notin paths$.

**Case 1:** Lemma 1 assumes that $y' = x$. From this and the definition of Case 1, our induction hypothesis tells us that $(x', y) \in paths$ prior to invocation $i$. Since add-path does not remove elements from $paths$, $(x', y) \in paths$ after invocation $i$, and so $\mathcal{C}$ holds.

**Case 2** From the definition of Case 2, we know that $(x, y)$ is added during the $i$th invocation of add-path. This implies that $(x, y)$ must have been added at one of the following locations (with the situation that led to the addition in parenthesis):

a. $[17a]$ ((1) of Observation 3)
b. $[22a]$ ((2) of Observation 3)
c. $[28a]$ ((3) **or** (4) of Observation 3)

We note that the most complex scenario is the second possibility for subcase c (4). We prove only the second possibility for subcase c, and note that subcases a, b, and the first possibility of subcase c can be proven analogously.

**Step 2.1:** We first observe that prior to invocation $i$, $(x', y') \in paths$ (by the assumptions of Case 2) and $(x, p) \in paths$ (by the assumptions of the second possibility of Case 2c). If $(x', y') \in paths$ and $(x, p) \in paths$ prior to invocation $i$, and $y' = x$ (by assumption of Lemma 1), then our induction hypothesis tells us that $(x', p) \in paths$.

**Step 2.2:** Since $(q, y) \in paths$ (by the assumptions of the second possibility of Case 2c) we can apply Observation 1 to conclude that, by the time $[24a]$ is reached, $(p, y) \in newPaths$.

From Step 2.1, we know that prior to invocation $i$, $(x', p) \in paths$ and from Step 2.2 we know that by the time $[24a]$ is reached, $(p, y) \in newPaths$. From this, we can apply Observation 2 to conclude that $(x', y)$ will be added to $paths$. Thus $\mathcal{C}$ holds.

**Case 3** We note that both $(x, y)$ and $(x', y')$ can be added to $paths$ in any of the three locations mentioned in case 2. Again, we prove the most complex case (the second possibility of subcase c), where both $(x, y)$ and $(x', y')$ are added on $[28a]$.

Since Case 3 assumes that both $(x, y)$ and $(x', y')$ are added during the $i$th invocation of add-path, we can apply Observation 3 to both $(x, y)$ and $(x', y')$ to conclude that $(x, p), (x', p), (q, y)$, and $(q, y')$ are all elements of $paths$ prior to invocation $i$. Since $(q, y) \in paths$, Observation 1 tells us that by the time $[24a]$ is reached, $(p, y) \in newPaths$. Since $(x', p) \in paths$ and $(p, y) \in newPaths$, Observation 2 tells us that when add-path terminates, $(x', y) \in paths$ fulfilling $\mathcal{C}$.

Since each of the three subcases of the inductive case allows us to conclude $\mathcal{C}$, the induction hypothesis is true after invocation $i$.

Having shown that $\forall(x, y) \in paths$, $\forall(x', y') \in paths$, $(\mathsf{unify}(y', x) \neq \bot) \supset (x', y) \in paths$ holds for the base case and the inductive case, we can conclude that Lemma 1 holds. □

**Lemma 2** *From an initially empty knowledge base, If $c_1, \ldots, c_n$ are the credentials given to* PC *as input for invocations $1, \ldots, n$, then after the $n$th invocation of* PC*, the following must hold for each $c_j, j \leq n$:*

1. *If $((p, q) \leftarrow \mathsf{credToPath}(c_j)) \neq \bot$ and $\mathsf{depends\text{-}on}(c_j) = \bot$, $\mathsf{add\text{-}path}((p, q))$ has been invoked and $(p, q) \in paths$.*
2. *If $((p, q) \leftarrow \mathsf{credToPath}(c_j)) \neq \bot$, $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{depends\text{-}on}(c_j)$ and $\pi \in paths$, $\mathsf{add\text{-}path}((p, q))$ has been invoked and $(p, q) \in paths$.*

*Proof* We note that $incompletePaths$ is a list of tuples that contain a credential and the path it depends on. The path is derivable directly from the credential, and is included only for ease of indexing. For ease of presentation, we will refer to the elements of $incompletePaths$ as credentials. We prove Lemma 2 by induction over the number of invocations $i$ of PC. Our induction hypothesis is that conditions 1-2 of Lemma 2 (which we label $\mathcal{C}$) hold after invocation $i - 1$.

**Base case:** The base case occurs when $i = 1$. It is straightforward to see that for any credential $c_1$ such that $\mathsf{credToPath}(c_1) \neq \bot$ and $\mathsf{depends\text{-}on}(c_1) = \bot$, $c_1$ will be converted to a path and given to add-path on $[9p]$. Since $paths$ is initially empty, it is not possible for a path to depend on a $\pi \in paths$ as is required by the second condition of Lemma 2. In this case, if $\mathsf{credToPath}(c_1) \neq \bot$ and $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{depends\text{-}on}(c_1)$, $c_1$ must be added to $incompletePaths$ on $[6p]$.

**Inductive case:** For the inductive case, if $\mathsf{credToPath}(c_i) = \bot$, PC immediately exits ($[3p]$). If $\mathsf{credToPath}(c_1) \neq \bot$, $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{depends\text{-}on}(c_1)$, and $\pi \notin paths$, $c_i$ is added to $incompletePaths$, and PC will exit without adding any new paths. In both cases, $\mathcal{C}$ is trivially true by the induction hypothesis.

In all other cases, $c_i$ will be converted to a path $(p, q)$ and given to add-path ($[9p]$), which adds $(p, q)$ to $paths$ ($[17a]$). However, if $c_i$ was given to add-path ($[9p]$), it is possible that the invocation of add-path added to $paths$ a path $\pi$ that a previous credential $c_j$ (where $0 < j < i$) depends on. If such a path was added, then $c_j \in incompletePaths$ (by $[6p]$ of the $j$th invocation of PC). To compensate for this, after invoking add-path for $c_i$, PC iterates through $incompletePaths$ ($[10p]$) and invokes add-path for any credential that depends on a path $\pi \in paths$.

We have shown that after the $i$th invocation of PC completes, add-path has been invoked for $c_i$. We have also shown that for any credential $c_j \in incompletePaths$ that depends on a path created during the $i$th invocation of PC, add-path has been invoked for $c_j$ as well. From this and our induction hypothesis, we can conclude that when PC exits, add-path has been invoked with each credential that depends on a path $\pi \in paths_i$, which satisfies the conditions of $\mathcal{C}$. □

**Theorem 2** *If* PC *has completed on $KB$, then for any $A, B$ such that $A \neq B$, if $(B \textbf{ says } F \supset A \textbf{ says } F)$ for some $F$ then $(B \textbf{ says } F, A \textbf{ says } F) \in KB$.*

*Proof* If $(B \textbf{ says } F \supset A \textbf{ says } F)$ is true, then there must exist a set of delegation credentials from which we can conclude $(B \textbf{ says } F \supset A \textbf{ says } F)$. Since all credentials are given as input to PC, from Lemma 2 we can conclude that add-path has been invoked for all independent credentials and for all dependent credentials that depend on a path that exists. We then apply Lemma 1 to show that, from the set of credentials given to add-path, all possible paths have been constructed, thus proving Theorem 2. □

# C Completeness of Delayed Backward Chaining

Our objective is to demonstrate that the proving ability of a prover that uses delayed backward chaining is strictly greater than the proving ability of a prover that uses the inline backward chaining algorithm presented in our previous work [9]. For the purpose of formal comparison, we assume that all caching optimizations described in our previous work are disabled.

We refer to the inline backward chaining prover of our previous work (reproduced in Figure 12) as bc-ask$_I$. An astute reader will notice that bc-ask$_I$ outputs either a complete proof or $\perp$, while bc-ask$_D$ may additionally output a marker indicating a choice subgoal that needs to be proved. As such, a wrapper mechanism must be used to repeatedly invoke bc-ask$_D$ (shown in Figure 2), aggregate markers, and chose which marker to purse, e.g., by asking the user. To accomplish this, we introduce the abstraction of a *distributed prover*, of which bc-ask$_I$ is an example. To construct a distributed prover using bc-ask$_D$, we define a wrapper, bc$_D$ (shown in Figure 13) that accomplishes the above objectives. bc$_D$ is designed explicitly for formal comparison; as such, it lacks mechanisms (e.g., for local credential creation, user interaction) that are necessary in practice, but not present in bc-ask$_I$. The addition of these mechanisms allows the delayed distributed prover to find proofs in situations where an inline distributed prover is unable to do so.

Our task is now to show that a delayed distributed prover will find a proof of a goal if an inline distributed prover finds a proof. We let $[kd]$ represent line $k$ in bc-ask$_D$, $[kbcd]$ represent line $k$ in bc$_D$, and $[ki]$ represent line $k$ in bc-ask$_I$. We will make use of the term *recursion height*, defined below. Note that because all the functions we consider here are deterministic, the recursion height is well-defined.

**Definition 2** *We define the* environment *of a function invocation to be the values of all globals when the function is called and the parameter values passed to the function. The* recursion height *of a function in a given environment is the depth of recursive calls reached by an invocation of that function with that environment.*

```
0   global set KB                                                          /* knowledge base */

1   substitution bc-ask_I(                                                 /* returns a substitution */
        list goals,                                                        /* list of conjuncts forming a query */
        substitution θ,                                                    /* current substitution, initially empty */
        set failures)                                                      /* set of substitutions that are known
                                                                             not to produce a complete solution */
2       local substitution answer                                          /* a substitution that solves all goals */
3       local set failures'                                                /* local copy of failures */
4       local formula q'                                                   /* result of applying θ to first goal */

5       if (goals = [ ] ∧ θ ∈ failures) then return ⊥                      /* θ known not to produce global solution */
6       if (goals = [ ]) then return θ                                     /* base case, solution has been found */
7       q' ← subst(θ, first(goals))

8       l ← determine-location(q')                                         /* prove first goal locally or remotely? */
9       failures' ← failures

10      if (l ≠ localmachine)
11          while ((α ← rpc_l(bc-ask_I(first(goals), θ, failures'))) ≠ ⊥)   /* make remote request */
12              failures' ← α ∪ failures'                                  /* prevent α from being returned again */
13              answer ← bc-ask_I(rest(goals), α, failures)                /* prove remainder of goals */
14              if (answer ≠ ⊥) then return answer                         /* if answer found, return it */

15      else foreach (P, q) ∈ KB                                           /* investigate each tactic */
16              if ((θ' ← unify(q, q')) ≠ ⊥)                               /* determine if tactic matches first goal */
17                  while ((β ← bc-ask_I(P, compose(θ', θ), failures')) ≠ ⊥)   /* prove subgoals */
18                      failures' ← β ∪ failures'                          /* prevent β from being returned again */
19                      answer ← bc-ask_I(rest(goals), β, failures)        /* prove remainder of goals */
20                      if (answer ≠ ⊥) then return answer                 /* if answer found, return it */
21      return ⊥                                                           /* if no proof found, return failure */
```

Figure 12: bc-ask$_I$, an inline backward chaining algorithm [9]

**Terminating tactics** We note that when the inline prover finds a proof by making a remote request, it may not fully explore the search space on the local node. Since a delayed prover investigates all branches locally before making a request, should a later branch not terminate, no solution will be found. We assume here that all sets of tactics terminate on any input, which is a requirement in practice to handle the case in which no proof exists. In the case where a depth limiter is necessary to guarantee termination, the same limit will be used for both delayed and inline provers.

**Lemma 3** *Consider two knowledge bases $KB$ and $KB'$ such that $KB \subset KB'$. Assume that when trying to prove goal $G$ using $KB$,* bc-ask$_D$ *finds $\rho$, which is either a complete proof or a proof containing a marker. If* bc-ask$_D$ *is invoked repeatedly with goal $G$ and knowledge base $KB'$ and each previous proof is added to $failures$, then an invocation of* bc-ask$_D$ *will find $\rho$.*

*Proof sketch* As discussed in Section 7, we assume that the logic is monotonic—that is, if a proof of $G$ exists from $KB$, it also exists from $KB'$. Line $[11d]$ iterates through all elements of the knowledge base. The only places that exit this loop prematurely are $[18d]$, $[21d]$, and $[23d]$. Through induction over the recursion height of bc-ask$_D$, we can show that if the proof returned by one of these lines is added to $failures$ on a subsequent call to bc-ask$_D$ ($[11d]$), then that proof will be disregarded and the next element of the

```
0   ⟨substitution, credential[ ]⟩ bc_D(                    /* returns a substitution */
        list goals,                                        /* list of conjuncts forming a query */
        substitution θ,                                    /* current substitution, initially empty */
        set failures)                                      /* set of substitutions that are known
                                                              not to produce a complete solution */
1       local set markers, failures'
2       failures' ← failures
3       while ((⟨β, creds⟩ ← bc-ask_D(goals, θ, failures')) ≠ ⊥)   /* find all solutions */
4           if notMarker(β), return ⟨β, creds⟩              /* if complete proof found, return*/
5           markers ← markers ∪ {β}
6           failures ← failures ∪ {β}

7       for each m ∈ markers
8           ⟨f, θ, failures'⟩ ← m
9           while((⟨α, creds⟩ ← rpc_l(bc_D(f, θ, failures'))) ≠ ⊥)
10              failures' ← α ∪ failures'
11              addToKB(creds)
12              ⟨β, creds⟩ ← bc_D(goals, θ, failures)
13              if (β ≠ ⊥), return ⟨β, creds⟩
14      return ⟨⊥, null⟩
```

Figure 13: $\mathsf{bc}_D$, a wrapper to process partial proofs returned by $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$

knowledge base will be considered. If this is repeated sufficiently many times, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ using $KB'$ will find the same proof produced by $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ using $KB$. □

**Lemma 4** *For any goal $G$ and knowledge base $KB$, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ using tactic set $\mathcal{T}$ will find a proof of $G$ without making any remote requests if $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ using $\mathcal{T}$ will find a proof of $G$ without making any remote requests.*

*Proof sketch* If $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ finds a proof without making a request, then the proof must be completable from the local knowledge base and the search for the proof must not involve investigating any formulas of the form $A$ **says** $F$ such that $\mathsf{determine\text{-}location}(A) \neq localmachine$. Our induction hypothesis states that if both $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ and $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ make a recursive call with identical environments that will have recursion height $h$, then the recursive $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ call will return the same result as the recursive $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ call.

**Base case:** The base case is when the recursion height $= 0$, which occurs when $goals = [\,]$. Since an assumption of this case is that all input parameters to $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ are the same as $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$, by inspection of the algorithms ($[3d]$-$[4d]$, $[5i]$-$[6i]$), $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ and $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ will both return $\perp$ if $\theta \in failures$, or $\theta$ otherwise.

**Inductive case:** For the inductive case, we assume that, at recursion height $h+1$, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ was invoked with the same parameters as $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$. Since, by the assumptions of this lemma, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ does not make any remote requests, $l$ must resolve to the local machine on $[6d]$ and $[8i]$, thus bypassing $[9d]$-$[10d]$ and $[11i]$-$[14i]$. This means that both strategies will behave identically until after $q'$ is unified against an element in the $KB$ ($[12d]$, $[16i]$). At this point, there are two cases to consider: (1) $(P, q)$ is a tactic or (2) $(P, q)$ represents a credential. In either case, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_I$ will continue to $[17i]$.

**Case 1:** If $(P, q)$ is a tactic, then $P$ will be non-empty, causing $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ to continue to $[19d]$ . At this point, the parameters to the recursive call on $[19d]$ are identical to those of $[17i]$, and we can apply our induction hypothesis to conclude that $[19d].\beta = [17i].\beta$. $\beta$ is then added to $failures'$, ensuring that

the parameters to $[19d]$ will remain identical to $[17i]$ on subsequent iterations. Since, by assumption, no remote requests are necessary, $[21d]$ will never be executed. Since all parameters to the recursive call on $[22d]$ are identical to those of $[19i]$, we can apply our induction hypothesis to conclude that $[22d].answer = [19i].answer$. If $answer \neq \bot$, it will be returned in both scenarios, otherwise bc-ask$_D$ and bc-ask$_I$ will continue to the next iteration of $[19d]$ and $[17i]$. With $[22d].answer = [19i].answer$ for each iteration, if bc-ask$_I$ returns a solution, bc-ask$_D$ will also. Otherwise, bc-ask$_D$ and bc-ask$_I$ will return $\bot$.

**Case 2:** The second case occurs when $(P, q)$ represents a credential. This implies that $P$ is an empty list. Then, $[17i]$ will return with $\beta = \bot$ if compose$(\theta', \theta) \in failures'$ ($[5i]$), and $\beta =$ compose$(\theta', \theta)$ ($[6i]$) otherwise. Note that $\beta$ is added to $failures'$ on $[18i]$, so the recursive call inside the while loop on $[17i]$ will succeed only once.

Because $P = [\,]$, the condition of the if statement on $[14d]$ will be true. If $\phi \in failures'$ (where $\phi =$ compose$(\theta', \theta)$ from $[13d]$) then $[16d]$-$[18d]$ will not be executed. bc-ask$_D$ will then proceed to try the next element in the knowledge base ($[11d]$), which is the same as the behavior of bc-ask$_I$ when $[17i].\beta = \bot$. If $[15d].\phi$ is not in $failures'$, then $[16d]$-$[18d]$ will be executed. Since $\phi$ is not modified between $[13d]$ and $[17d]$, $[17d].\phi =$ compose$(\theta', \theta) = [19i].\beta$. At this point, we know that all parameters to the recursive call on $[17d]$ equal those of $[17i]$. At this point, we can apply our induction hypothesis to show that $[17d].answer = [19i].answer$. From this, we can conclude that if bc-ask$_I$ finds a proof, bc-ask$_D$ will find a proof as well. □

**Lemma 5** *For any distributed proving node attempting to prove goal $G$ with knowledge base $KB$,* bc$_D$ *will find a proof of $G$ if* bc-ask$_I$ *would find a proof of $G$, under the assumption that all remote requests, if given identical parameters, will return the same answer in both strategies.*

*Proof* We prove Lemma 5 via induction over the number of remote requests $r$ that a local prover using bc-ask$_I$ makes to complete the proof. Our induction hypothesis states that for all queries such that bc-ask$_I$ finds a proof with $r - 1$ requests, bc$_D$ will find a proof as well.

**Base Case:** The base case occurs when $r = 0$ and can be shown by direct application of Lemma 4.

**Inductive Case:** We prove the inductive case by (1) showing that bc$_D$ will eventually make a remote request that is identical to the initial remote request made by bc-ask$_I$, (2) showing that when bc$_D$ re-runs the entire query after the remote request finishes ($[12bcd]$), this query will be able to find a proof of the formula proved remotely in (1) using only local knowledge, and (3) showing that, after deriving the proof described in (2), bc-ask$_D$ will recurse with the same parameters that bc-ask$_I$ recurses with after bc-ask$_I$ finishes its initial remote request.

**Step 1:** By an argument analagous to that of Lemma 4, we assert that bc-ask$_D$ will behave identically to bc-ask$_I$ until the point at which bc-ask$_I$ encounters a goal for which it needs to make a remote request ($[11i]$). At this point, bc-ask$_D$ will construct a marker ($[9d]$) containing the same parameters as bc-ask$_I$ would use to make the remote request.

Since bc$_D$ exhaustively investigates all markers ($[7bcd]$), it will investigate the marker described above. Thus, bc$_D$ will make a remote request with identical parameters to the request made by bc-ask$_I$, which, by the assumption of this lemma, will return the same result under both strategies.

**Step 2:** We refer to the invocation of bc-ask$_D$ that constructed the marker in Step 1 as $M$. We proceed to show that, after the remote request has been made, bc-ask$_D$ will retrace its steps to $M$, meaning that it will make a recursive invocation at the same recursion depth as $M$ with identical parameters to $M$.

By inspection of bc-ask$_D$ (in particular, $[18d]$ and $[23d]$), we can see that all credentials used in a proof of a goal are returned when the query terminates. Thus, when a remote request for a goal $f$ ($[9bcd]$) returns with a complete proof, the response will include all of the credentials necessary to re-derive that proof. These credentials are added to the knowledge base on $[11bcd]$, so from Lemma 3 we can conclude that the local prover can now generate a complete proof of $f$.

Thus, when bc$_D$ re-runs the entire query ($[12bcd]$), it will retrace its steps to $M$, possibly exploring additional branches, but eventually exploring the same branch as the first query. Upon reaching $M$, bc-ask$_D$ will first construct a remote marker identical to the one produced in the first round ($[9d]$), but, since bc$_D$ repeatedly invokes bc-ask$_D$ until a either complete proof has been found or no more markers exist, bc-ask$_D$ will be invoked again with that marker in $failures$ ($[12bcd]$). This time, bc-ask$_D$ will attempt to prove the first$(goals)$ ($[11d]$), and having sufficient credentials, will generate the same proof ($[14d]$ or $[19d]$) as was returned by the remote request. Note that it is possible to generate alternative proofs first, but the combination of bc$_D$ repeatedly invoking bc-ask$_D$ ($[12bcd]$) with previous solutions included in $failures$ and the loops on $[11d]$ and $[19d]$ ensures that the solution identical to the result of the remote request is eventually found.

**Step 3:** From Step 2, we know that bc-ask$_D$ finds the same proof of first$(goals)$ as bc-ask$_I$ does. In the case where first$(goals)$ is provable directly from a credential, this means that $[17d].\phi = [13i].\alpha$ In the case where first$(goals)$ is not provable directly from a credential, $[22d].\beta = [13i].\alpha$. In either case, rest$(goals)$ and $failures$ are identical those of invocation $M$, which, in turn, is identical to the invocation of bc-ask$_I$ that made the remote request for which $M$ constructed a marker. At this point, we have shown that all parameters to the recursive bc-ask$_D$ call (either $[17d]$ or $[22d]$) are identical to those of $[13i]$.

The knowledge base $KB'$ used by bc-ask$_D$ was initially identical to the knowledge base $KB$ used by bc-ask$_I$. However, bc$_D$ added the credentials returned by the remote request to $KB'$ ($[11bcd]$), resulting in a $KB'$ such that $KB \subset KB'$. By Lemma 3, we can conclude that bc-ask$_D$ will eventually find the same proof using $KB'$ as it finds using $KB$. Thus, if we can prove Lemma 5 when bc-ask$_D$ uses $KB$, the result will hold when bc-ask$_D$ uses $KB'$. From the previous paragraph, we know that all parameters to the recursive bc-ask$_D$ call (either $[17d]$ or $[22d]$) are identical to those of $[13i]$, and from this paragraph, we can conclude that the knowledge base in use by bc-ask$_D$ is identical to that of bc-ask$_I$.

The proof created in the inline strategy on $[13i]$ must be completable with $r - 1$ remote requests, as one remote request has already been made. At this point, we can apply our induction hypothesis to show that either $[17d].answer = [13i].answer$ or $[22d].answer = [13i].answer$. From this and inspection of $[18d]$, $[23d]$, and $[14i]$, it is clear that bc-ask$_D$ will find a proof if bc-ask$_I$ is able to find a proof. □

**Theorem 3** *For any goal $G$, a delayed distributed prover with global knowledge base $KB$ will find a proof of $G$ if an inline distributed prover using $KB$ will find a proof of $G$.*

*Proof* We first define the remote request height $h$ of a proof to be the recursion height of the algorithm with respect to remote requests. For example, if $A$ asks $B$ and $C$ for help, and $C$ asks $D$ for help, the remote request height of $A$'s query is 2.

We are trying to show that bc$_D$ (which invokes bc-ask$_D$) will produce a complete proof if bc-ask$_I$ produces a complete proof. We prove Theorem 3 by induction over the remote request height of the proof.

Our induction hypothesis states that if bc-ask$_I$ and bc$_D$ are invoked with parameters $P$ (which include goal $G$), and bc-ask$_I$ finds a proof of $G$ with remote request height at most $h$, bc$_D$ will find a proof of $G$ as well.
**Base Case:** The base case occurs when $h = 0$. Since this corresponds to the case where bc-ask$_I$ does not make any remote requests, we can apply Lemma 4 to conclude that bc$_D$ will produce a proof if bc-ask$_I$ produces a proof.
**Inductive Case:** For the inductive case, we note that any remote requests made by bc-ask$_I$ operating at request height $h + 1$ must have height at most $h$. Lemma 5 proves that bc$_D$ will find a proof of $G$ if bc-ask$_I$ finds a proof of $G$ under the assumption that any remote request made by bc$_D$ with parameters $P$ will return the same result as a remote request made by bc-ask$_I$ with parameters $P$. Since any remote requests must have height at most $h$, we can apply our induction hypothesis to discharge the assumption of Lemma 5 which allows us to conclude that bc$_D$ will find a proof if bc-ask$_I$ finds a proof with request height $h + 1$. □

# D Completeness of LR Tactics

IR and LR are both tactic sets that are used in a common distributed proving framework, which we will refer to as *DP*. This framework, formed by the combination of bc-ask$_D$ (Figure 2) and bc$_D$ (Figure 13), is responsible for identifying choice subgoals, determining if the formula under consideration can be proved either directly from cache or by recursively applying tactics. We assume that all tactics and inference rules are encoded such that their premises are proved from left to right. In any situation where IR must use a depth limit to ensure termination (rather than for efficiency), we assume that LR uses the same depth limit.[5]

For simplicity, when referencing the version of the distributed proving framework that uses IR tactics, we will simply write IR. We write LR to refer to a version of the distributed proving framework that uses LR tactics in conjunction with FC and PC.

**Lemma 6** *Consider the case in which* IR *is given the query* $A$ **says** $F$ *and each of the first series of recursive* bc-ask$_D$ *calls made by* IR *is an application of a delegation rule for which the left premise is provable, and the next recursive* bc-ask$_D$ *call by* IR *is to prove* $B$ **says** $F$. *If* LR *is also given query* $A$ **says** $F$, LR *will eventually attempt to prove* $B$ **says** $F$.

*Proof sketch* If the first $r$ recursive bc-ask$_D$ calls made by IR are applications of a delegation rule for which the first premise is provable, and the $(r + 1)$ recursive bc-ask$_D$ call ($[17d]$, $[22d]$) by IR is to prove $B$ **says** $F$, then it must be true that $B$ **says** $F \supset A$ **says** $F$. From Theorem 2, we know that the path $(B$ **says** $F, A$ **says** $F)$ is in the knowledge base. Since LR has a left tactic whose conclusion is either equal to, or more general than, the conclusion of the delegation rule that was applied by IR in the $r$th recursive call, LR will use this tactic to exhaustively try all paths whose conclusion unifies with $A$ **says** $F$ and attempt to prove the premise of each such path. Eventually, LR will try the path $(B$ **says** $F, A$ **says** $F)$, and attempt to prove $B$ **says** $F$. □

**Lemma 7** *If* IR *finds a proof of* $F$ *with marker* $m$ *using knowledge base* $KB$, *a version of* IR *with cycle prevention will also find a proof of* $F$ *with marker* $m$ *using* $KB$.

*Proof sketch* As defined in Section 6, we refer to the version of IR with cycle prevention as IR-NC. We define a cycle to exist if a prover attempts to prove formula $F$ as part of the recursive proof of $F$. In this case, when IR attempts to prove $F$, it will apply a sequence of inference rules that lead it to attempt to prove

[5] In practice, we have not encountered a situation in which a depth limit was necessary for LR.

$F$ again. As repeated applications of bc-ask$_D$ may only decrease the generality of a substitution $\theta$ ($[13d]$), the subsequent attempt to prove $F$ will be with a $\theta$ that is more specific than the initial attempt. Additionally, the substitutions present in $failures$ accumulate as bc-ask$_D$ recurses ($[16d]$, $[20d]$) . From this, we know that the subsequent attempt to prove $F$ will do so in an environment that is strictly more restrictive (more specific $\theta$, more substitutions in $failures$). Thus, if IR finds a proof of $F$ on the subsequent attempt, we can conclude that a proof of $F$ can be found on the initial attempt. Since the only difference between IR-NC and IR is that IR-NC eliminates cycles, IR-NC will be restricted to finding a proof of $F$ on the initial attempt. Since we have shown that IR is capable of finding a proof of $F$ on the initial attempt if it is able to find a proof on the subsequent attempt, we can conclude that IR-NC will find a proof of $F$ on the initial attempt as well. □

**Lemma 8** *If both* IR *and* LR *invoke* bc-ask$_D$ *with identical parameters and* IR *finds a complete proof from local knowledge, then* LR *will find a complete proof from local knowledge as well.*

*Proof* Since *DP* will not automatically make any remote requests, if IR finds a complete proof of goal $A$ **says** $F$, then there is a series of inference rules that, when applied to a subset of the locally known credentials, produces a proof of $A$ **says** $F$. Theorem 1 shows that FC produces a proof of each formula for which a proof is derivable from locally known credentials, so a proof of $A$ **says** $F$ will be found by *DP* and returned immediately before any LR tactics are applied. □

**Lemma 9** *If both* IR *and* LR *invoke* bc-ask$_D$ *with identical parameters, and if* IR *finds a proof with marker* $m$ *then* LR *will find a proof with marker* $m$*.*

*Proof* We define the depth of a proof to be the depth of the tree that represents the series of inference rules that, when applied to the original goal, constitute a proof of the goal. To prove Lemma 9, we use induction over the depth $d$ of the proof found by IR. Our induction hypothesis that if both IR and LR invoke bc-ask$_D$ with identical parameters, Lemma 9 will hold for proofs with depth at most $d$.

**Base case:** The base case occurs when $d = 0$. Since Lemma 9 assumes that bc-ask$_D$ does not return a complete proof, we know that the base case represents the creation of a marker. This is handled by *DP* in a way that is independent of the tactic set.

**Inductive case:** For the inductive case, let the formula that IR and LR are attempting to prove be $A$ **says** $F$. The proof of $A$ **says** $F$ that IR is able to find has depth $d + 1$ and contains marker $m$.

Let $((P = p_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge p_j), q)$ represent the first inference rule applied to $A$ **says** $F$ by IR. This rule is either a delegation rule or a standard (i.e., non-delegation) rule. Since the only manner in which IR and LR differ is in the rules dealing with delegation, if $(P, q)$ is a standard rule, LR will apply this rule during the course of an exhaustive search. At this point, both IR and LR will attempt to prove all formulas in $P$. The proofs of these formulas can have depth at most $d$, so we can apply our induction hypothesis to show that LR will find a proof with marker $m$ for this case.

If $(P, q)$ represents a delegation rule, then $P$ will consist of two formulas, $p_l$ and $p_r$. If IR finds a proof of $q = A$ **says** $F$ with marker $m$, then either (a) the proof of $p_l$ contains $m$, or (b) $p_l$ is provable from local knowledge and the proof of $p_r$ contains $m$.

**(a)** Here we note that if IR finds a proof of $p_l$ with marker $m$, then we can apply Lemma 7 to conclude that IR-NC finds a proof with marker $m$ as well. The right tactic of LR differs from the corresponding inference rule in IR-NC only in that LR requires that $p_l$ not be provable from local knowledge (as described in Section 5.2). Thus, if IR-NC investigates $p_l$, LR will apply a right tactic and investigate $p_l$ as well. Since the proof of $p_l$ found by IR can have depth at most $d$, we can apply our induction hypothesis to show that LR will find a proof of $p_l$ containing marker $m$ in this case.

**(b)** If $p_l$ (the premise pertaining to delegation) is provable, then when LR applies a left tactic, we can apply Lemma 6 to show that both IR and LR will ultimately investigate the same right subgoal (e.g., $B$ **says** $F$). The proof of this subgoal must have depth at most $d$, so we can apply our induction hypothesis to to show that LR will find a proof with marker $m$ in this case. □

**Theorem 4** *If* IR *finds a proof of goal* $F$*, then* LR *will find a proof of* $F$ *as well.*

*Proof sketch* We prove Theorem 4 by induction over the recursion height (see Definition 2) of $\mathsf{bc}_D$. Our induction hypothesis states that at recursion height $h$, any recursive call to $\mathsf{bc}_D$ with environment $\varepsilon$ made by LR will return a proof if a recursive call to $\mathsf{bc}_D$ with environment $\varepsilon$ made by IR returns a proof.
**Base case:** The base case occurs when the recursion height $= 0$. Since recursion of $\mathsf{bc}_D$ occurs only when a proof involving a marker is found, we can conclude that, if IR tactics are able to find a complete proof, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ will return a proof that does not include a marker ($[3bcd]$). We can apply Lemma 8 to conclude that, when using LR tactics, $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ will also return a proof.
**Inductive case:** For the inductive case, we let $h+1$ be the recursion height of the current invocation of $\mathsf{bc}_D$. $\mathsf{bc}_D$ recurses on $[12bcd]$ only if the proof returned by $\mathsf{bc\text{-}ask}_D$ ($[3bcd]$) contained a marker indicating that a remote request is necessary. From Lemma 9, we know that the marker returned by LR will be the same as the marker returned by IR. From this, we know that the remote request made by $\mathsf{bc}_D$ on $[9bcd]$ will have the same parameters in both the LR and IR scenarios. If we momentarily assume that the remote request returns the same response in both scenarios, then we can show that each of the parameters of the recursive call on $[12bcd]$ in the LR scenario are the same as those of the IR scenario. Since the recursive call on $[12bcd]$ must have height at most $h$, then we can apply our induction hypothesis to conclude that $\mathsf{bc}_D$ will return find a proof using LR tactics if it is able to find one using IR tactics.

We now return to the assumption that remote requests made with the same environment in both scenarios will return the same result. This assumption can be relaxed via a proof that inducts over the remote request height of the distributed prover. This proof is analagous to that of Theorem 3. □