



Analytic Approaches to Insider Risk Quantification

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Document Markings

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
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
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The CERT National Insider Threat Center


Conducting research, modeling, analysis, and outreach to develop socio-technical solutions to combat insider threats since 2001




Scope of the Insider Threat



Past, Present, and Future Research




A Conceptual Model



Source: Greitzer, et al., "Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation," PNNL-SA-65204, April 2009.

A Balanced Approach to Insider Risk Management

Organizations typically focus their insider threat programs almost exclusively on negative incentives.



Negative incentives alone can exacerbate the threat they are intended to mitigate.*

Basic Tenet: Organizations should explicitly consider a mix of positive and negative incentives to build insider threat programs that are a net positive for employees and the organization.

* See "Effective Insider Threat Programs: Understanding and Avoiding Potential Pitfalls," SEI Digital Library, March 2015.

Research Highlights

[Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 6th Edition](#)

[Insider Risk Indicators Using Microsoft Telemetry](#)

[The Critical Role of Positive Incentives For Reducing Insider Risk](#)

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