|Title:||Are Security Experts Useful? Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Network Security Games with Limited Information|
|Authors:||Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, and John Chuang|
|Publication Date:||April 23, 2010|
A common assumption in security research is that more individual expertise unambiguously leads to a more secure overall network. We present a game-theoretic model in which this common assumption is challenged. Our findings indicate that expert users can be not only invaluable contributors, but also free-riders, defectors, and narcissistic opportunists. A direct application is that user education needs to highlight the cooperative nature of security, and foster the community sense, in particular, of higher skilled computer users.
As a technical contribution, this paper represents, to our knowledge, the first formal study to quantitatively assess the impact of different degrees of information security expertise on the overall security of a network.
Full Report: CMU-CyLab-10-010
Related Project : Security and Privacy Risk Management in Organizations