The library of assets produced by the MERIT project provides a collection of tools that have been very effective in transitioning our knowledge of insider IT sabotage to an international audience of security experts, IT practitioners, all levels of government and business managers, and law enforcement. The primary objective of this project is to extend MERIT to include a comprehensive pattern analysis and transition mechanism for all types of insider threat, including fraud, theft of confidential or sensitive information, and IT sabotage. In addition to looking in detail at insider fraud and theft of information cases, we are now collecting and analyzing insider compromises that have occurred since 2002. This extends the terms of analysis of the original Insider Threat Study, which analyzed insider compromises against U.S. critical infrastructure sectors occurring from 1996 to 2002.
Outputs of this project will include a complete package of empirically-based insider threat System Dynamics models, as well as a full-day insider threat workshop that includes in-depth analysis and interactive discussion of the behavioral and technical aspects of insider fraud, theft of confidential or sensitive information, and IT sabotage. We expect that participation in the workshop will empower corporate and government personnel to develop comprehensive, efficient, and justifiable defenses to insider threats along with the organizational understanding and support needed to maintain a strong security posture over time.